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INTRODUCTION
It is a warm July night, and the weather is perfect for a
stroll. You make your way towards the local park, expecting to
clear your head in quiet solitude. To your dismay, something is
awry. Dozens—perhaps hundreds—of people have invaded in
and around your lovely local park. Now that this gathering has
tainted your walk, you approach someone, hoping that he will
explain what has happened. Before you can utter, “Excuse me,”
people start shouting about a “vaporeon.” Then the stampede
begins.
This bizarre scenario described above actually occurred in
Central Park in New York City after the release of Pokémon Go.1
Pokémon Go is a location-based augmented reality game that
allows a person to catch virtual creatures, known as “pokémon,”
through the screen of her phone.2 Not only has the game
spawned thousands of pokémon, but it has also spawned dozens
of questions regarding how the law should adapt in response to
†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2019, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, Fordham University. I would like to
thank Professor Jeremy Sheff for his guidance and patience throughout the
numerous drafts of my Note, as well as the Law Review editors and staffers for their
hard work and support throughout the publication process.
1
R. Darren Price, Rare Pokemon Sparks Stampede in Central Park, NBC 4 NEW
YORK (July 18, 2016), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Pokemon-Go-PlayersStampede-New-York-Central-Park-387303572.html. Central Park was not the only
place to have a stampede caused by Pokémon Go players. Other stampedes occurred
in Kaka’ako and Taipei, to name a few places. See Sunset Beach, Pokémon GO!
Stampede: Kaka'ako, Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii (08/13/2016), YOUTUBE (Aug. 15,
2016), https://youtu.be/klUPu3Kvamc.
2
See Andrew L. Rossow, Gotta Catch . . . a Lawsuit? A Legal Insight into the
Intellectual, Civil, and Criminal Battlefield ‘Pokémon Go’ Has Downloaded onto
Smartphones and Properties Around the World, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 329, 330 (2017).
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the game and others like it.3 Important among these legal
questions is how augmented reality games such as Pokémon Go
intersect with the First Amendment.4 This question has yet to
receive serious attention in the scholarly literature.
What exactly is augmented reality? It is “an enhanced
version of reality created by the use of technology to overlay
digital information on an image of something being viewed
through a device.”5 In other words, augmented reality projects
digital images into the real world, and people see these images
through an electronic device.6 Location-based augmented reality,
also known as markerless augmented reality, uses GPS to
function.7 Although there are other types of augmented reality,8
this Note will discuss only location-based augmented reality.

3
These issues mainly revolve around property and tort law. For an overview of
many of these private law issues, see generally Russow, supra note 2; Samuel
Mallick, Note, Augmenting Property Law: Applying the Right To Exclude in the
Augmented Reality Universe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1057 (2017); Pramitha
Krishnamurthyprakash, Potential Post-Pokémon Legal Issues for Augmented Reality,
LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/890096/potential-post-poke
mon-legal-issues-for-augmented-reality.
4
But see Brian Wassom, Sacred Ground: When (Augmented) Worlds Collide,
AUGMENTED LEGALITY (July 15, 2017), http://www.wassom.com/sacred-ground-aug
mented-worlds-collide.html. In his blog, Wassom makes an interesting argument
that as augmented reality video games become more common, there may be a
dispute among different games being played in the same physical space. Id.
Although he mentions in passing that the government might be able to prohibit the
playing of these augmented reality games in public places, Wassom fails to address
the issue any further. See id.
5
Ryan Mitchell, Comment, Pokémon Go-es Directly to Court: How Pokémon Go
Illustrates the Issue of Virtual Trespass and the Need for Evolved Tort Laws, 49 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 959, 962 (2017) (quoting Augmented Reality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014), https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/augmented%20reality).
6
In contrast, virtual reality replaces the real world with an artificial
environment that has been digitally created, and people interact with this digital
environment. See Om Malik, Pokémon Go Will Make You Crave Augmented Reality,
THE NEW YORKER (July 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/poke
mon-go-will-make-you-crave-augmented-reality.
7
See Sanket Prabhu, Types of Augmented Reality (for Me and My Business),
ARREVERIE LEARNING (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.arreverie.com/blogs/types-ofaugmented-reality/.
8
Other types include “marker-based” augmented reality, like QR codes, and
“outlining” augmented reality, such as the lines that appear on side and rearview
backup cameras in modern cars. See id. Even Snapchat utilizes augmented reality
for its filters. See Husain Sumra, Augmented Reality Explained: What Is AR and
What’s Coming?, WAREABLE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.wareable.com/ar/every
thing-you-need-to-know-about-augmented-reality.

AUGMENTING OUR REALITY

2018]

945

Specifically, this Note will argue that the First Amendment
applies to location-based augmented reality games in public
forums, and, furthermore, the First Amendment protects
designers and players of location-based augmented reality games
in public forums. This Note will not discuss these location-based
games within the context of privacy rights or trespassing, issues
that have been written about elsewhere.9 Part I of this Note will
explore the law regarding freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly in public forums, and permissible regulations of speech
and assembly, including time, place, and manner restrictions and
prior restraints, such as permits. Part II will discuss Candy Lab,
Inc. v. Milwaukee County, the first reported case to address
whether location-based augmented reality games have First
Amendment protection.10 Part III will explore the extent to
which the First Amendment protects the designers and players of
location-based augmented reality games, and possible
regulations the government may use to lawfully curb the rights
of the designers and players.
I.
A.

THE THORNY FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

General

The First Amendment is rich in case law; therefore, its
analysis can be confusing.11 With the advancement of technology,
the Supreme Court has continued to apply the same doctrine,12
albeit with new wrinkles that depend largely upon the medium
the Court is analyzing.13 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n, the Court recognized that video games are forms of speech

9

See, e.g., Mallick, supra note 3, at 1057; Mitchell, supra note 5.
266 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (E.D. Wis. 2017).
11
For a summary of the development of the First Amendment and the benefits
of the right of freedom of speech, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 11.1.1–11.1.2 (5th ed. 2015). The Supreme Court also
discusses the value of this First Amendment freedom in Cohen v. California. 403
U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971).
12
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“[W]hatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command,
do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.” (quoting
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952))).
13
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and
the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers.
Each . . . is a law unto itself . . . .”).
10
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and therefore have First Amendment protection.14 By extension,
location-based augmented reality video games should also enjoy
some measure of First Amendment protection. Discussed below
are various hallmarks of free speech and freedom of assembly
jurisprudence that will form part of the discussion of First
Amendment protections for location-based augmented reality
video games, the designers of these games, and the players of
these games.
B. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral
“[T]he First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”15 Therefore, “[c]ontent-based
regulations are presumptively invalid”16 and “subject to strict
scrutiny.”17 A court determines whether a law is content-based
by evaluating whether the law targets the topic or viewpoint of
the speech.18 For example, a law that bans discussion of Harry
Potter books but permits discussion of all other books would be
content-based because it targets the topic of the speech.19
Another subset of content-based regulation is viewpoint-based
regulation,20 which is considered more suspect than regulations
14

564 U.S. at 790.
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24).
16
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)); see also
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (citing Simon &
Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 118).
17
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434 (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115,
118); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our
precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”
(citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115)).
18
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (citing Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011)). The Court also states that it will
consider a law content-based if it appears facially content-neutral but “cannot be
‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ or [was] adopted
by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19
Carey v. Brown demonstrates this kind of content-based law. 447 U.S. 455
(1980). There, an ordinance prohibited picketing in residential neighborhoods unless
it was related to a labor dispute for a place of employment. Id. at 457. The Supreme
Court struck down the ordinance because it favored labor picketing over nonlabor
picketing, and such targeting of the topic of the speech was unconstitutional. Id. at
461–63.
20
See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980).
15
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targeting topics of speech.21 A law targets the viewpoint of the
speech and therefore is also content-based if, for example, it
allows pro-Harry Potter conventions but not anti-Harry Potter
conventions. If a court determines that a law is content-based,
then the “[g]overnment [must] prove that the restriction furthers
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.”22
In contrast, a law is content-neutral if it is unrelated to the
content of the speech.23 For example, a general ban on the
burning of books in parks would be content-neutral because the
content of the books is irrelevant—no one is permitted to burn
any book within a park.24 The fact that the ban only applies to
books and no other mediums does not equate to it being contentbased.25 The Supreme Court has described a law as contentneutral if it is “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.”26 A law is content-neutral whether it “applies
to all speech regardless of the message” or whether it regulates
conduct and has an incidental effect on speech without regard to
its content.27 For example, suppose a group obtains a permit to
hold a demonstration in a park to protest communism. As part of
that demonstration, the group plans to burn books promoting
communism. However, an ordinance bans the burning of books
21
Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (“Regulation of the subject
matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also
an objectionable form of content-based regulation.” (citing Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., 447 U.S. at 538)).
22
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also,
e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing
Carey, 447 U.S. at 461).
23
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (citing Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
24
But see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315–17 (1990). There, the
government passed an act that banned the burning of United States flags. Id. at 314.
Although the act had “no explicit content-based limitation[,]” the Court determined
it was content-based because the government’s motive in passing this act was
“related ‘to the suppression of free expression.’ ” Id. at 315 (quoting Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)). If the book burning ban described above was
motivated by the government’s desire to suppress the opinions of people who believe
in censorship, then it might be content-based despite appearing content-neutral.
25
See Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1149 (E.D. Wis.
2017) (“[A] speech regulation that applies to one medium (or subset thereof) but not
others . . . ‘is insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment concerns.’ ” (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26
E.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 980.
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in public parks because of the government’s interests in
preventing fires from spreading and protecting the parks.
Although the ordinance has an incidental effect on the
demonstrators’ speech, the ordinance would still be contentneutral because the regulation of the conduct was without regard
to the content.28
C. Public Forums
Public forums are difficult to categorize.
They are
government property open to the public, but the circumstances
surrounding the facts of each case determine the availability for
speech within a particular forum.29 The “character of the
property at issue” will determine a person’s right to access that
property and the limitations that the government may place on a
person’s rights regarding that property.30 Legislatures may enact
statutes “which prevent[] serious interference with normal usage
of streets and parks.”31 For example, people may speak in a park
or on the street without any hesitation, but imagine people
having a conversation about Game of Thrones in the middle of a
courtroom while a trial is occurring. Generally, courts consider
areas like streets, parks, and sidewalks to be public forums that
are open for speech.32 In these “quintessential public forums, the
government may not prohibit all communicative activity”33—even
if allowing such speech imposes costs on the government.34

28
Cf. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294–95 (concluding that the prohibition on sleeping in
the park was content-neutral and had nothing to do with curbing the expressive
message of the demonstrators’ sleeping).
29
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.4.2.1, at 1187.
30
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
31
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (quoting Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293–94 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45) (“[M]embers of the public retain strong free speech
rights when they venture into public streets and parks . . . .”); see also Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) (“Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”). But see United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727–30 (1990) (determining that a sidewalk on post
office property was a non-public forum, not a traditional public forum).
33
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
34
See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (“Any burden imposed
upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect
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Although there are other types of forums which would include
areas like public libraries and prisons,35 the focus of this Note
will be on First Amendment rights regarding traditional public
forums like parks, streets, and sidewalks.
D. Vagueness and Overbreadth
Vagueness and overbreadth are common issues in cases
involving freedom of speech in public forums. A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.”36 Although the vagueness doctrine
developed from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,37 it is equally important in cases involving the First
Amendment. The Court has noted that freedom of speech must
be protected, not only because it is important in society but also
because the right itself would be easy to destroy.38 Therefore,
“standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the
That being said, the Court
area of free expression.”39

consequence of such distribution [of leaflets] results from the constitutional
protection of the freedom of speech and press.”).
35
Other forum categories are designated public forums, which the government
has opened for use by the public, and non-public forums, which the government uses
for an intended purpose other than the freedom of speech. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460
U.S. at 45. A library would be a designated, or limited, public forum. See Kreimer v.
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261–62 (3d Cir. 1992). Meanwhile, a prison would
be a non-public forum. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). For a
summary of the considerations that the Supreme Court uses to determine the type of
forum, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.4.2.6, at 1209.
36
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (concluding that a law is unconstitutionally
vague when “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application”).
37
Williams, 553 U.S. at 304.
38
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“[Freedom of speech is]
delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. . . First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive . . . .”).
39
Id. at 432.
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acknowledges that language itself is vague.40 Thus, while the
vagueness standards require “narrow specificity,”41 the Court
does not expect “perfect clarity.”42
Overbreadth occurs when a law “prohibits a substantial
amount of protected speech.”43 “[S]ubstantial overbreadth” does
not merely mean that a Court will deem a statute as overbroad
because there are a few scenarios in which the statute would
“impermissibl[y]” apply to First Amendment rights.44 Instead,
the statute must threaten to significantly curb recognized
freedom of speech rights for it to be potentially overbroad.45 This
requirement that the overbreadth be substantial likely stems
from the fact that a person who violated a permissible
application of the law can argue that the law would
impermissibly apply to third parties.46 Although litigating for a
third party generally is prohibited,47 the overbreadth doctrine is
an exception.
E. Expressive Conduct
The Court does not recognize all conduct as speech.48 To be
protected under the First Amendment, an activity needs to have
more than a “kernel of expression.”49 Once the Court recognizes
that conduct has First Amendment protection, “[t]he government
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than
40

See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“Condemned to the
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”).
41
Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
42
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (“[P]erfect clarity and
precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict
expressive activity.”).
43
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 11, § 11.2.2.
44
Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
800 (1984).
45
Id. at 801 (“[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”).
46
Cf. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (explaining that the requirement for substantial
overbreadth is to balance the need to deter the chilling of free speech with the wish
not to strike down a perfectly constitutional law).
47
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). The issue of standing
would arise in such situations, but that is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
general discussion about standing and third parties, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note
11, § 2.5.4.
48
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ . . . .”).
49
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
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it has in restricting the written or spoken word.”50 Expressive
conduct may be subject to a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction.51
F.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

The aim of a “time, place, and manner restriction” is for “the
government to regulate speech in a public forum in a manner
that minimizes disruption of a public place while still protecting
freedom of speech.”52 Time, place, and manner restrictions are
reasonable, and therefore permissible, “provided [that they] ‘are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.’ ”53
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court stated that while a
time, place, and manner restriction must be “narrowly tailored”
to meet the government’s interest, it does not have to be the
“least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”54 The
Court did note, however, that the restriction also may not
“burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further
the government’s legitimate interests.”55
A time, place, and manner restriction is justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech when it is
content-neutral.56 For example, in Thomas v. Chicago Park
50
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). But see James. M. McGoldrick,
Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 25–26
(2008) (“[T]he Johnson claim that courts have a ‘freer hand’ in regulating symbolic
speech was in error. . . . The only difference that should exist between the test for
symbolic speech and pure speech should relate to any difference in state interests
raised by the symbolic aspects to the speech.”).
51
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
52
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.4.2.2, at 1194.
53
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark, 468
U.S. at 293); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; see also Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981). But see generally Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996). In his essay, Volokh argues that courts should reject the
strict scrutiny analysis altogether because it leads to inconsistent outcomes. Id. at
2460–61.
54
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
55
Id. at 799; see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014).
56
See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Occasionally, a time, place, and
manner restriction will be upheld despite being content-based. See Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197–98, 211 (1992) (holding that requiring solicitors of votes
to stand one hundred feet away from the entrance of a polling place satisfied strict
scrutiny).
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District, the Court held that an ordinance requiring persons to
obtain a permit when there is a gathering of fifty or more people
was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.57 The
Court reasoned that it was content-neutral because any
gathering of fifty or more people required a permit regardless of
what the gathering was for.58 Furthermore, denial of a permit
was irrelevant to the content of the speech.59
Once the Court has established that the law is contentneutral, it will determine if the law is narrowly tailored for that
significant governmental interest.60
Several significant
governmental interests that the Supreme Court has recognized
include protecting “traditional public forums” from “excessive
noise,”61 “ensuring public safety,”62 allowing pedestrians and
motor vehicles to move about freely,63 “avoiding visual clutter,”64
and protecting national parks.65
In acknowledging these
significant government interests, the Court recognizes the rights
of the majority in society. For example, by protecting public
forums from excessive noise, the government is protecting the
unwilling listener’s “right to be let alone.”66 The right to be let
alone remains a “recognizable privacy interest in avoiding
unwanted communication” although the right is much less
important in public forums than it is in one’s own home.67

57

Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002).
Id.
59
Id. When a permit was denied, the Park District had to explain in writing
why the permit was denied and, when possible, suggest ways to cure defects in the
application. Id. at 318–19. If denial was due to that place being unavailable, the
Park District had to suggest other times or places to hold the event. Id. at 319.
60
See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2530 (“The content-neutrality prong of the Ward
test is logically antecedent to the narrow-tailoring prong, because it determines the
appropriate level of scrutiny.”).
61
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
62
See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997).
63
See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994).
64
Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
806–07 (1984).
65
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1984).
66
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000) (“The unwilling listener's
interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our
cases. It is an aspect of the broader ‘right to be let alone’ that one of our wisest
Justices characterized as ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.’ ” (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting))).
67
Id. at 716.
58
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Despite the Court recognizing these governmental interests
as significant, the law may still fail if “a substantial portion of
the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the
government’s] goals.”68 For example, in United States v. Grace,
the Supreme Court struck down a regulation that prohibited
persons on the public sidewalks surrounding a courthouse from
displaying flags, signs, or other devices that would draw the
public’s attention to any organization.69 The Court reasoned that
the government had enacted the regulation to ensure peace and
order around the courthouse, but this total ban on the sidewalk
did not advance this governmental interest.70 Thus, the ban was
not justified, and the Court struck it down.71
Finally, if the Court finds that a law is content-neutral and
is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, it
will uphold the law if ample alternative channels of
communication remain. Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence provides an excellent example of this ample alternative
channels prong.72 There, demonstrators wished to call attention
to the homeless by, among other things, sleeping in tents in a
park.73 Yet, the demonstration was to occur in a park where
people were not allowed to sleep.74 The demonstrators argued
that the inability to sleep in the parks curtailed their ability to
demonstrate the plight of the homeless.75 The Supreme Court
agreed with the demonstrators but ultimately decided that the
time, place, and manner restriction was reasonable.76 The
demonstrators had been permitted to erect a symbolic tent city
and continue a twenty-four-hour vigil; therefore, the Court was
satisfied with the other channels of communication open to the
demonstrators.77

68

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
461 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1983).
70
Id. at 182; see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
71
Grace, 461 U.S. at 183.
72
468 U.S. 288 (1984).
73
Id. at 289.
74
Id. at 290–91. More specifically, park regulations prohibited camping in this
park. Id. “Camping,” as defined in the regulation, included “using any tents
or . . . other structure . . . for sleeping.” Id. (alteration in original).
75
Id. at 296.
76
Id. at 298.
77
Id. at 295.
69
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G. Prior Restraints – Permits
A “prior restraint” “describe[s] administrative and judicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in
advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”78
Common types of prior restraints are license and permit
requirements.79 Although prior restraints are presumptively
invalid,80 the Supreme Court will often uphold a permit or license
requirement as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction
if it meets three criteria.81
First, the government must have an important reason to
require a license or permit.82 For example, the government may
require a permit to host a parade or demonstration to prevent
multiple groups from attempting to use the same space at one
time and to give the government notice to provide “proper
Second, the government must provide clear
policing.”83
standards that “leav[e] almost no discretion to the licensing
authority.”84 The reason for limiting discretion is clear: Such
discretion could easily lead to censorship of viewpoints that the
license-granting authority disagrees with.85 Finally, the licensing
or permit system must have procedural safeguards.86 When the
government requires permits in a public forum, it does not
violate the procedural safeguard prong by failing to initiate
litigation every time it denies a permit.87 As long as the licensing
78

Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011.
80
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
81
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011.
82
Id.
83
See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
84
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011; cf. Cox, 312 U.S. at 576
(“[T]he licensing board [is] not vested with arbitrary power or an unfettered
discretion . . . its discretion must be exercised with ‘uniformity of method of
treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate
considerations and from unfair discrimination . . . .’ ”).
85
See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 284 (1951) (concluding that the
City Council denied permits to the Jehovah’s Witnesses because it disagreed with
their opinions); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
757 (1988) (“[A] licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a
government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in
censorship.”).
86
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.2.3.4, at 1011, 1013.
87
See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002). But see Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“The teaching of our cases is that, because only a
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity
to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices
to impose a valid final restraint.”).
79
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authorities have almost no discretion, and there is some form of
review, the permit requirement in a public forum has passed the
procedural safeguard prong.88
H. Freedoms of Assembly and Association
“The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”89 It
“[is] regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights . . . .”90 An assembly of people may advocate
their views more effectively than only one or two people
advocating something because others may more easily ignore
them.91 Indeed, the act of assembling itself is a form of
expression.92 People may assemble for a variety of reasons,
including to speak, to learn, to watch, to play, or to advocate; and
most assembly in a public forum is acceptable as long as it is for
a “lawful purpose.”93 However, the right of assembly may be
curtailed by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.94
For example, people are generally not permitted to assemble in
the middle of a busy intersection because that would interfere
with the free flow of traffic.95
Related to the freedom of assembly is the freedom of
association.96 The First Amendment protects the freedom of
association,97 regardless of whether the group is religious or

88

See, e.g., Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (quoting De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
Id. at 577.
91
See infra note 100; see also John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of
Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 597 (2010).
92
See Inazu, supra note 91.
93
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring)).
94
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (“The rights of free speech and
assembly . . . do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
address a group at any public space and at any time.”).
95
See id. at 554–55 (“[One cannot] insist upon a street meeting in the middle of
Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. . . . A
group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or
entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree
to listen to their exhortations.”).
96
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 990 (2011).
97
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163 (1992); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966).
89
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secular98 and regardless of whether it “associate[s] for the
‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message.”99 Derived from the
freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, the Court first
recognized the freedom of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson.100 Although the Supreme Court has sometimes
used
the
freedoms
of
assembly
and
association
interchangeably,101 “assemblies were probably understood as ad
hoc groups gathered in public or private while associations
constituted more permanent groupings of citizens, meeting either
publicly or in private.”102
“An association must . . . engage in expressive activity that
could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”103 The
First Amendment protects associations despite when some
members of a group act or advocate in ways that are not
protected.104 Although the Supreme Court has stated that it will
“give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its
expression,”105 it has imposed limitations to the breadth of its
deference. For example, a court will not protect people’s freedom

98

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
189 (2012).
99
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000).
100
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. . . . It is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”); see also Thomas I.
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 1–2
(1964); Inazu, supra note 91, at 609.
101
Bhagwat, supra note 96, at 984; see, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 409, 411 (1950).
102
See Bhagwat, supra note 96, at 990 (citing John D. Inazu, The Strange
Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485, 491 (2010)).
103
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
104
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (“The right
to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members
of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not
protected.”); see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (“If the persons
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, . . . they may be prosecuted for their
conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the
State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation
in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge.”).
105
Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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to associate to the extent that they are doing something illegal,106
nor will it protect the freedom of association when the purpose of
that association is to “depriv[e] third parties of their lawful
rights.”107
II. CANDY LAB, INC. V. MILWAUKEE COUNTY
At the time of writing this Note, Candy Lab, Inc. v.
Milwaukee County is unique because it is the first and only case
that addresses First Amendment protections related to locationbased augmented reality games in public forums.108 In Candy
Lab, the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance that would
require a company to obtain a permit for its location-based
augmented reality game to be played in parks.109
The ordinance itself was adopted in light of the
unanticipated popularity of Pokémon Go.110 At the game’s peak,
Pokémon Go “players trashed Milwaukee County parks, stayed
after park hours, caused significant traffic congestion, and made
excessive noise.”111
In response, Milwaukee County spent
thousands of dollars to maintain its parks and provide more
police services.112 Additionally, the County passed an ordinance
106
See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 933 (recognizing the
legitimacy of the demonstrators’ objectives but refusing to protect the violent
conduct of some of the demonstrators).
107
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).
108
See Kimberly I. Culp & Taylor Sachs, Candy Lab and the Changing Reality
of Augmented Reality, LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/
956398/candy-lab-and-the-changing-reality-of-augmented-reality; see also Brian
Wassom, Game On: Candy Lab AR Files First Amendment Challenge to Milwaukee’s
Pokemon Go-Inspired Ordinance, AUGMENTED LEGALITY (Apr. 21, 2017),
http://www.wassom.com/game-candy-lab-ar-files-first-amendment-challengemilwaukees-pokemon-go-inspired-ordinance.html#more-6545. The court itself also
acknowledges that it is deciding on very new issues. See Candy Lab, Inc. v.
Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1145 (E.D. Wis. 2017). As a side note, a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Niantic, the company that created Pokémon
Go, because people have asserted their rights to privacy against Niantic. See Class
Action Complaint at 3–4, Marder v. Niantic, Inc., No. 4:16-cv-04300 (N.D. Cal. Jul.
29, 2016).
109
266 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.
110
See id. at 1142–43. Another Pokémon Go-related bill was proposed in Illinois.
It was the “Location-Based Video Game Protection Act,” otherwise known as
“Pidgey’s Law.” See H.B. 6601, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016). The
purpose of the bill was to provide a property owner a procedure to have a locationbased video game removed from the owner’s property. Id. It is unlikely that this bill
will be passed, however, because it was adjourned sine die on January 10, 2017. Id.
111
Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
112
Id.
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that required companies to obtain permits before their locationbased augmented reality games could be played in Milwaukee
County Parks.113
Candy Lab, Inc. was a company that developed the app
“Texas Rope ‘Em,” which is a location-based augmented reality
game.114 Texas Rope ‘Em is similar to a traditional poker game,
and part of the gameplay involves players traveling to real-world
locations to collect cards.115 These cards are then used when
playing against the dealer in the game.116 Candy Lab, Inc. moved
for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Milwaukee
County’s permit requirement.117
In granting the preliminary injunction, the court considered
many issues that arose regarding the rights of an augmented
reality game.118 Did the game qualify as a “game” that was
protected under the First Amendment? Was the permit contentneutral?
Did it provide little discretion to the licensing
authority? Was the ordinance itself unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad? Or was it narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
government interest?
Did the government leave ample
alternative channels of communication, or did the ordinance
substantially burden more speech than necessary?

113
Id. This ordinance is not the first one a legislature has passed to prevent
children from playing games. The Candy Lab court cites to the case Weigand v.
Village of Tinley Park, where a town ordinance prohibited anyone “to play any
games upon any street, alley, or sidewalk, or other public places except when a block
party permit has been issued by the President and the Board of Trustees.” 114 F.
Supp. 2d 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Because of this ordinance, police ticketed parents,
calling them “irresponsib[le]” for allowing their children to play games on the
sidewalk. Id. The court found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because
it failed to define the term “game” and was overly broad because it could apply to
anything from trading Pokémon cards and playing chess to playing tag during
recess. Id. at 736–38. The broad reaches of the ordinance failed to be narrowly
tailored for any government interest, and instead, the ordinance substantially
burdened more speech than necessary. Id. at 737. Therefore, the court granted a
preliminary injunction because it found that the ordinance was unconstitutional
under rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 737–38. Later, the court granted a permanent
injunction. See Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
114
Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
115
Id.
116
Josephine Munis, Candy Lab, Inc. Launches Texas Rope ‘Em!, CANDY LAB
NEWS (Mar. 12, 2017), http://news.candylab.com/2017/03/candy-lab-inc-launchestexas-rope-em.html.
117
Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
118
See id.
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The ordinance required companies to obtain permits for
virtual and location-based augmented reality games before the
games would be permitted to be played in any Milwaukee County
Parks.119 Once a permit was obtained, the company would have
to limit the game to “those areas designated with a permit for
such use by the Director of the Department of Parks, Recreation,
and Culture [(“Director”)].”120 The permit process included the
Director reviewing the game “to determine the appropriateness of
the application based on site selection, protection of rare flora
and fauna, personal safety, and the intensity of game activities
on park lands.”121 Although the game would only be permitted to
operate during standard park hours, the Director could also
authorize special events to occur outside the park’s normal
operating hours.122
The ordinance defined “virtual gaming” as “an activity
during which a person can experience being in a threedimensional environment and interact with that environment
during a game.”123 The ordinance further explained “virtual
gaming,” stating that “the game typically consists of an artificial
world of images and sounds created by a computer that is
affected by the actions of a person who is experiencing it.”124 The
ordinance stated that Pokémon Go was an example of “virtual
gaming,” and it implied that Pokémon Go would also be a
“location-based augmented reality game[].”125 However, the
ordinance never actually defined the term “location-based
augmented reality game.”126
The permit application required for “virtual gaming” was ten
pages long and required a company to provide an extensive
amount of information, including event dates and times,
estimated attendance, if the event would be advertised and how,
and the location within the park.127 The companies were
required to provide “detailed plans for garbage collection, on-site
security, and medical services,” all of which the companies would

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 1143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143–44.
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have to provide for themselves.128 The companies also had to
have liability insurance and pay several fees.129 Despite all of
these requirements, the Director could still demand more
information about the event, and after all of this, the parks have
“sole discretion [to] grant, deny, revoke, or suspend any permit,
at any time and for any reason.”130 Violation of the ordinance
could result in a myriad of punishments: Violators could be fined
between $10 and $200, and an unpaid fine could result in a court
order of up to ninety days in jail.131 Police officers could arrest
violators, and the Director could even issue citations.132
In response to this tedious permit process, Candy Lab, Inc.,
which planned to release the then-new location-based augmented
reality game “Texas Rope ‘Em,” requested a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance.133 Before
the court ultimately granted the preliminary injunction, the
court first determined whether Texas Rope ‘Em qualified for
First Amendment protection.134 It accepted that video games had
First Amendment protection and that the First Amendment
continued to apply when newer mediums developed.135 The court
also believed that Texas Rope ‘Em contained enough expressive
conduct to qualify for First Amendment protection even if the
game itself “is not the expressive equal of Anna Karenina or
Citizen Kane.”136 Therefore, the court concluded that Candy
Lab’s game enjoyed a measure of protection under the First
Amendment.137
128

Id. at 1144.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1141. Candy Lab first launched Texas Rope ‘Em on March 10, 2017.
See Candy Lab, Inc., Welcome to Texas Rope ‘Em!, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=egt75ZrYH3Q.
134
See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1146.
135
Id.; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
136
Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724
F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013)). The court made it clear that it was not going to
make “aesthetic judgments, since the task of courts is not to act as critics.” Id.
137
Id. at 1147. In concluding that Texas Rope ‘Em had First Amendment
protection, the court is the first to recognize First Amendment rights for augmented
reality games. Id. at 1146. Interestingly, another caveat for the court here was
determining whether Texas Rope ‘Em qualified for protection despite having
gambling elements to its gameplay. Id. at 1147. Because the game was free, lacked
prizes, and relied on more than mere chance, the court believed that the game was
not illegal gambling, which would have resulted in the game having no protection
under the First Amendment. Id.
129
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After determining that Texas Rope ‘Em qualified for First
Amendment protection, the court analyzed whether Milwaukee
County’s ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction on location-based augmented reality games.138 The
court first determined that the ordinance was content-neutral
because the undesirable effects of Pokémon Go—not a disdain for
Pokémon Go itself—prompted the legislature to create
regulations that would prevent other and all augmented reality
games from reproducing those undesirable effects.139 The fact
that the regulation applied only to a subset of the augmented
reality medium did not result in a contrary conclusion.140
Although one could argue that the ordinance attacked the
expressive quality of location-based augmented reality games
themselves because it limited the interactive aspects of the game,
the court was unwilling to take the analysis to this extreme.141
Despite holding that the ordinance was content-neutral, the
court found that the ordinance had myriad problems, making it
unconstitutional.142
Among these problems was that the
ordinance did not appear to be narrowly tailored to serve the
government’s interests.143 Instead of targeting the players, the
ordinance targeted the companies producing augmented reality
games.144 In targeting the companies, the ordinance treated the
playing of location-based augmented reality games as if such
playing constituted an event that required the companies to
provide clean-up and security, have insurance, and provide a
general time frame in which people will be at the parks
playing.145 Yet this was entirely inconsistent with how people
play these games.146 The average player plays whenever she has

138

See id. at 1148.
See id. at 1149.
140
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
141
See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. The argument was that a major
part of the gameplay of augmented reality video games is interacting with the real
world. Ordinances such as Milwaukee’s would seriously restrict gameplay by
limiting the areas in which a person could physically play the game, thus limiting
part of the expression. Id.
142
See generally id.
143
See id. at 1153.
144
See id.
145
See id.
146
See id. Events may sometimes be coordinated in advance to occur at a certain
place, but they are not the norm. It took Niantic a year to hold its first official
“Pokémon Go Fest,” and it is unlikely to have another official in-person event any
time soon. See Megan Farokhmanesh, I Went to Pokémon Go Fest, and It Was a
139
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some free time regardless of the time or location.147 Regulating
augmented reality games in such a manner is similar to
requiring a company to obtain a permit every time someone
wants to read its book in a park. It expects a company to know
when such an event will occur even though people usually read at
their own inclination.148 In short, the ordinance showed that the
government, in its misunderstanding of augmented reality
games, “sacrific[ed] speech for efficiency,” which is
impermissible.149
The court did not address whether the ordinance left ample
alternative channels for communication of the expression.
However, the ordinance might fail this prong as well. The ability
to play location-based augmented reality games anywhere is
already curtailed by people’s privacy rights.150 The areas where
these games have the most First Amendment protection are
public forums such as parks and sidewalks.151 Because of how
difficult it would be to obtain a permit based on Milwaukee’s
ordinance, the playing of augmented reality games would
practically be limited to only sidewalks. Whether the sidewalks
alone leave ample alternatives for location-based augmented
reality games would be a difficult issue to determine, but given
the large amount of protection the First Amendment provides in
public forums,152 such a limitation would likely fail this prong.153
The permit requirement also fails in being a reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction. A significant defect is that the
permit process left too much discretion to the licensing
authority.154 Under the ordinance, the licensing authority “in its
sole discretion [could] grant, deny, revoke, or suspend any
Disaster, THE VERGE (July 25, 2017, 11:37 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/
7/25/16019404/pokemon-go-fest-refunds-disaster-review.
147
See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
148
This metaphor illustrates the problems of the ordinance’s permit process, but
books and location-based augmented reality games are not completely analogous
since companies do have some control over where elements of their games appear.
See Class Action Complaint, supra note 108, at 6–7.
149
See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1154 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.
Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).
150
See Class Action Complaint, supra note 108, at 3–4.
151
See cases cited supra note 32.
152
See cases cited supra note 32.
153
But cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53 (1986)
(holding that leaving a little over five percent of the entire land area in Renton open
for use as an adult theater site allowed for ample alternative channels of
communication).
154
See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1151–52.
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permit, at any time and for any reason.”155 Such unbridled
discretion is not constitutional.156 Even without this warning on
Milwaukee’s permit application, the standards themselves were
so vague that they allowed too much discretion on their own.157
The ordinance listed several criteria that would be used to
determine whether to grant a permit, mainly “the
appropriateness of the application based on site selection,
protection of rare flora and fauna, personal safety, and the
intensity of game activities on park lands.”158
The court
questioned how a company would know which plants were “rare,”
or when people were trampling on too many flowers, or how
“intensity” was defined.159 The ordinance also failed to explain
what “site selection” would be appropriate for augmented reality
games.160
Another consideration the ordinance listed was “personal
safety.”161 The court recognized that safety could be a reasonable
concern allowed under the First Amendment, but it did not
accept that “personal safety” was definite enough to be
reasonable.162 Indeed, the entire ordinance was riddled with
indefiniteness, for the ordinance did not define the term
“location-based augmented reality games.”163
Because the
considerations themselves were vague and the licensing
authority had too much discretion, the court concluded that the
ordinance also lacked the necessary procedural safeguards
required for permits to be valid under the First Amendment.164
Without adequate standards, a court would have trouble
providing judicial review.165 In other words, “[w]ithout these
guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and
the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making

155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 1151.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1152–53.
Id. at 1151.
See id. at 1152.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1152–53.
See id. at 1143.
See id. at 1150–52.
See id. at 1151.
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it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether
the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing
unfavorable, expression.”166
III. REGULATING THE PLAYERS WITH REASONABLE TIME, PLACE,
AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS WOULD BEST PROTECT THE
GOVERNMENT’S INTERESTS AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE
DESIGNERS AND PLAYERS
The ordinance in Candy Lab imposed such a significant
number of requirements that the court rightfully granted a
preliminary injunction against its enforcement.167 Yet the heavy
burden imposed by the ordinance ultimately made it an easy case
to determine. The more difficult questions are whether and
when the government may restrict location-based augmented
reality games in public forums.
A.

Defining “Location-Based Augmented Reality Games”

Before placing any sort of restrictions on location-based
augmented reality games, there needs to be a working definition
for “location-based augmented reality games.”
Without a
workable definition, a law will likely fail for being
unconstitutionally vague.168 In attempting to define the term, a
good place to begin would be the dictionary.169 As stated in the
Introduction, augmented reality is “an enhanced version of
reality created by the use of technology to overlay digital
information on an image of something being viewed through a
device.”170
Location-based augmented reality uses GPS or
technology of a similar nature to project the augmented images

166

See id. (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
758 (1988)).
167
The Weigand court later held the ordinance that prohibited playing games
was both facially and otherwise unconstitutional. See Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley
Park, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The court therefore granted a
permanent injunction. Id.
168
Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2000); cf.
Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1143 (noting that “location-based augmented reality
games” were not defined in the ordinance).
169
Justices may sometimes use dictionaries to help them determine the
boundaries of a statute. For example, Justice Alito referred to the dictionary to
define the word “maiming” when it lacked a definition under California law. See
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 810 & n.4 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
170
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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when someone goes from one place to another.171 Therefore, a
potentially good definition of location-based augmented reality
would be “an enhanced version of reality that uses GPS, satellite,
or other similar technology to overlay, or project, a digital image
of something being viewed through a smartphone, tablet, or other
similar device.”172
B. Creating a Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restriction
Once there is a working definition, the legislature would
need to devise a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.
Some might argue that no time, place, and manner restriction
would be reasonable in a public forum because such a restriction
would limit the interactive part of the expression of the game.173
Location-based augmented reality games are distinct from other
video games because the vast majority of the gameplay requires
traveling to different locations to access features of the game;
they are not like standard video games which will provide the
same gameplay and features regardless of the location. By
limiting location-based augmented reality games even in public
forums, the government would arguably be limiting the
expression itself because players would then be unable to play
the game the way it was meant to be played.
This argument that no time, place, and manner restriction in
a public forum would be reasonable would likely fail in a
courtroom. Policy considerations would most likely lead a court
to conclude that a time, place, and manner restriction can be
upheld, but the government has to do its part in making the
Before a court will consider a
restriction reasonable.174
171

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Limiting restrictions on augmented reality games to only those that are
location-based could potentially cause other problems. For example, in 2012,
Nintendo released the game “Spirit Camera: The Cursed Memoir,” a Nintendo 3ds
game whose gameplay and extra features relied heavily on the use of marker-based
augmented reality in the form of QR codes. See Spirit Camera: The Cursed Memoir,
NINTENDO, https://www.nintendo.com/games/detail/ZlXHN669zp19PVP0PJ7Nh8K4
TVZ2DBKU (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). While the gameplay is limited to a smaller
vicinity than that of any location-based augmented reality game, “Spirit Camera:
The Cursed Memoir” still requires a player to do some moving around to play the
game. See Audrey Drake, Spirit Camera: The Cursed Memoir Review, IGN (Apr. 13,
2012), http://www.ign.com/articles/2012/04/13/spirit-camera-the-cursed-memoir-rev
iew. It would seem strange for a person to be allowed to play this augmented reality
game in an area while prohibiting location-based augmented reality games.
173
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
174
See Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1154 (E.D.
Wis. 2017).
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restriction reasonable, the government interest must be
significant.175 The concerns surrounding players of locationbased augmented reality games are that people will play while
driving, damage parks, litter, and disturb other people while
playing. Preventing or limiting all of these things are significant
government interests that the courts recognize.176 Although a
government interest may be significant—and the interest in
curbing the harmful effects of location-based augmented reality
games is significant—a law will not be reasonable if it
substantially burdens more speech than necessary in advancing
the government’s goals.177
1.

Regulating the Designers

Requiring companies to obtain permits for public forums
whenever they release a new location-based augmented reality
game may never be reasonable because such a requirement
would substantially burden more speech than necessary,
especially if the process of obtaining each separate permit
required paying fees.178 Imagine that a company releases its
game in every city in the United States, and then imagine that
company filling out permit applications and paying fees to every
municipality just to release its game. Faced with the prospect of
hundreds of applications and fees, the company may choose to
seriously limit its locations in the United States or avoid
releasing a game in the United States entirely, thus effectively
“shut[ting] off communication before it takes place.”179
Requiring the company to obtain permits would also be
ineffective in advancing the government’s interest since the
people playing location-based augmented reality games are
causing the undesirable effects. Obtaining a permit is not going
to prevent a person playing one of these games from littering or
sneaking into a park after hours. In fact, the company has little
control over when people decide to play their game. 180 Therefore,
175

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
177
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
178
Charging a fee to obtain a permit, however, may be impermissible. See Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (“There is nothing contrary to the
Constitution in the charge of a fee limited to the purpose stated.”).
179
See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506
(1970).
180
This is not to say that companies should not attempt to curb some of the
problems that have arisen related to location-based reality games. For example, a
176
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requiring the company to obtain a permit for people to play their
game in a public forum is likely unreasonable unless the
company intends to host an official event like Niantic did with
Pokémon Go Fest.181
2.

Regulating the Players

Indeed, targeting the company because of the conduct of the
players is equivalent to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.”182
A better approach would be to regulate the players themselves.183
However, when regulating the players, there is a tension. On the
one hand, the players are protected under the First Amendment.
On the other hand, non-players have their own rights, and the
government has interests to protect.
a.

The Rights of Individual Players Versus the Rights of an
Assembly of Players

Part of the difficulties involved in regulating players results
from the number of players playing at a given time in a given
place. An individual player can cause problems if she breaks into
a park at night or tries to cross the street without paying
attention. Yet the individual player would be easier to regulate,
and she is much less likely to infringe on the rights of nonplayers. When the individual player becomes a group, or an
assembly, more problems arise, the group becomes harder to
regulate, and more non-players have likely had their rights
infringed upon. Yet the rights of the assembly of players are
arguably more protected by the First Amendment than the rights
of the individual player because a court may consider an
individual’s act of playing to be less deserving of protection as
expressive conduct.184

company could lock down its application once a person starts moving over twenty
miles per hour, thus eliminating accidents occurring when a person plays a game
while driving. See Eric Lindenfeld, Pokemon Go’s Product Liability Woes, LAW360
(Aug. 3, 2016, 3:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/824588/pokemon-go-s-prod
uct-liability-woes. A company could also have its game display a warning screen
reminding the player to be aware of his or her surroundings when playing the game.
Id.
181
See Farokhmanesh, supra note 146.
182
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
183
See Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1153 (E.D.
Wis. 2017) (citing Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
184
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(“[E]xpressive conduct [is] protected to some extent by the First Amendment.”).
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When an individual plays a location-based augmented
reality game, the act of playing is the expression. Some may
argue this activity is merely a “kernel of expression,” and thus,
not deserving of protection.185
However, “video games
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many
familiar literary devices . . . and through features distinctive to
the medium.”186 Therefore, the Supreme Court has recognized
that video games deserve First Amendment protection.187 If
location-based augmented reality games had First Amendment
protection, but an individual player playing an augmented
reality game had less protection than the game itself, then, taken
to its logical extreme, the protection of the expression of the game
would be defeated because no one would be able to enjoy the
expression of the game. This problem would be akin to allowing
a company to publish a book but then censoring the public from
reading it. This logical extreme is not to say that any regulation
would be unconstitutional; for example, requiring individual
players to abide by park rules would be constitutional as long as
they were reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.188
The point is that the individual’s act of playing deserves First
Amendment protection. This Note argues that both individual
players and groups of players are equally deserving of protection;
however, legislatures should sometimes regulate individual
players differently than they regulate groups of players because
groups cause different problems.
There are two ways to think about groups of players. These
groups may be classified as assemblies, which have been thought
to mean ad hoc groups that may appear spontaneously.189
Alternatively, these groups may be classified as associations,
which are more permanent groups that meet.190 Groups of
players appear to have elements of assemblies and associations.
For example, a player may decide to go out with his or her
friends with the intent to play an augmented reality game. The
185

See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
187
See id.
188
See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (“All those who would resort to the parks must
abide by otherwise valid rules for their use, just as they must observe the traffic
laws, sanitation regulations, and laws to preserve the public peace.”). On a similar
note, legislatures may prohibit people from reading in certain circumstances, such as
when they are driving vehicles.
189
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
190
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
186
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group gets to their agreed-upon location only to find dozens of
other people playing the same game. Organically, an assembly
has formed. Now suppose this player goes out to the same
location every few days, knowing or expecting that she will find
other players there. Suddenly, the lines blur, and this group of
people is edging towards an association. In the context of one
game, the difference matters very little because the players have
the same rights whether they consider themselves a more
permanent group or casual players.191 What matters is that
there is a group of people assembling, and this assembling is
generally protected by the First Amendment even if the reason
for assembling is to play a location-based augmented reality
game.192
b.

Enforcing Laws Already in Effect

In Candy Lab, the court made several suggestions about how
to regulate players, including “aggressively penalizing gamers
who violate park rules or limiting gamers to certain areas of the
park.”193 Either of these suggestions could be reasonable. For
example, most parks have a closing time. Rather than being
given a warning, players who are caught breaking such rules
should be ticketed and have to pay a nominal fine. Players who
become too loud out of excitement may be charged with noise
violations. Players who decide to walk into the street to play
may get fined for jaywalking. If officers enforce these and other
similar laws, then players may be deterred from engaging in
some of their bad behaviors. The benefit of targeting these
violations of the law is that they do not impermissibly infringe on
First Amendment rights. The disadvantages are that targeting
such violations becomes harder as the number of players

191
This distinction might matter if players of different games find themselves
conflicting within the same spheres. Then the players might associate strongly with
one game over another. See supra note 4. It would be interesting if players argued
that they had the freedom from associating with players of other games. Cf.
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680 (2010) (“ ‘Freedom of association,’ we have recognized,
‘plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.’ ” (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, such an
analysis is outside the scope of this Note.
192
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
193
Candy Lab, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1153 (E.D. Wis.
2017).
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increases. Stopping and fining one or two violators would be
easier than attempting to fine dozens of violators. Likely, several
violators would manage to avoid being penalized.
Unlike an individual player, an assembly of players could
also potentially violate laws that require permits for gatherings
of a large group of people.194 Because of the organic nature of
these player assemblies, it would seem unjust to fine players who
appear in an assembly—even if large groups consistently form at
a certain place at a certain time. In such situations, officers
should be able to disperse the players, but this solution appears
problematic because of the general nature of location-based
augmented reality games. How does society expect players to
obtain permits when the location, time frame, and number of
players is so uncertain?195 Whether an individual or a group is
playing, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions should
effectively curb the problems caused by players while permissibly
restricting the players’ rights.
c.

Reasonable Regulations in Parks

Limiting the players to certain areas might be an effective
time, place, and manner restriction. The downside of this
limitation is that it could slip into an impermissible restriction of
the First Amendment. One issue is how the government can
balance its interests with accommodating the players. If players
were limited to only the sidewalks, their gameplay would be
quite limited. Additionally, players might cause problems for
pedestrian traffic, thus creating another issue for the
government. If players are limited to only certain areas within
public parks, how would the government choose the areas to
allow players to use?
The number of players may be
determinative in where they could play because a group of two
players would be much less disruptive than a group of twenty.
Additionally, the size of the parks and proximity to other parks
might matter.
Other considerations might include whether the parks were
designed with specific purposes in mind. A large park like
Central Park could theoretically have multiple areas designated
194

For example, New York City requires one to obtain a permit to have an
activity in a park with a group of twenty or more people. See Parks Special Event
Permit
Request,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
OF
PARKS
&
RECREATION,
https://nyceventpermits.nyc.gov/Parks/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
195
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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for players of location-based augmented reality games while
avoiding certain areas designated as quiet areas or in areas
where a player could most damage herself. But if all of the
closest parks are small, maybe less than a city block, then it
might be more worthwhile to allow play in some of the parks but
not all of them. In such situations, the government may consider
the accessibility of parks. If there are four parks all within equal
distance of each other, it might be beneficial to say that
augmented reality games could be played in two of them. Park
rules could allow the playing of location-based augmented reality
games on certain days, either alternating the days or limiting
them to the weekend when most people would be playing. One
issue with such limitations, however, is that when fewer players
are playing, they might not cause enough problems to warrant
being limited to only certain areas or certain parks.
The government may also consider the typical users of
particular parks. For example, it may not be reasonable for
players to play augmented reality games in a dog park, but it
would likely be reasonable to allow players to play in parks with
no specific designation. Whether it would be reasonable to play
location-based augmented reality games in playgrounds may
depend on the age of the players. If children and their guardians
were the players, such playing may be acceptable since
playgrounds are designed for children. However, if older players
were invading playgrounds to play augmented reality games,
they could potentially overtake the space from children. The
safety of children may also be affected if adults were suddenly
loitering in playgrounds. In such situations, a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation may be to create rules that only
allow children and their guardians on the playground.
Suppose a park that previously had no particular purpose or
few daily visitors develops into a frequented location for locationbased augmented reality game players. In many ways, such a
development would be good because it would mean that players
have a place to play without disturbing other people or activities.
Now suppose that the government chooses to repurpose the park
into a swimming pool or another facility that would remain
public but would no longer be suitable for playing augmented
reality video games. Then the players would likely have a claim
against the repurposing of the park because they are losing a
place to freely play. Not only would they lose a place to play, but
they may also then flock to other areas, causing overcrowding
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and other irritations that were previously eased by this park that
had mainly been used by location-based augmented reality game
players. Alternatively, players may have already been limited to
this park because other areas prohibit or severely limit the
playing of augmented reality games. Then players would have
difficulties playing at all. Ultimately, whether repurposing the
park would be reasonable would depend on the importance and
necessity of the new facility and on how burdensome the
repurposing would be on location-based augmented reality game
players.
d.

Reasonable Regulations on Sidewalks

In addition to some limitations in parks, some limitations on
playing on sidewalks might be reasonable. For example, suppose
that features of augmented reality games appear within a
hospital, and these features cause players to regularly roam
around that hospital. If such roaming interferes with hospital
employees’ abilities to work, a small buffer zone might be
warranted to protect the health and safety of citizens.196
Legislatures may also potentially prohibit players from playing
augmented reality games on the sidewalk in front of a post
office—or any other sidewalk that may not be a public forum.197
Finally, if players are consistently gathering on certain streets to
the point where they are preventing the free flow of pedestrian
traffic, then it may be reasonable to prohibit players from playing
augmented reality games on those sidewalks.
The areas in question may need to be areas that generally
have a large amount of foot traffic for the prohibition to be
reasonable. Alternatively, the prohibition may be only for a few
hours when the foot traffic would be most heavy—for example,
during rush hour on weekdays. To warn players about these
regulations, signs could be placed in those areas that would be
affected. Like there are signs to warn people about fines for
littering and about alternate side parking days, there could be
signs on busy streets that would prohibit the playing of
augmented reality games Monday through Friday between the
hours of 4:00 PM and 6:00 PM. Although this prohibition may

196
The Supreme Court has recognized that ensuring public safety is a
significant government interest. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519
U.S. 357, 376 (1997).
197
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728–29, 732–33 (1990).
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not be reasonable for the individual player, this limited
prohibition could prevent congestion when sidewalks are most
frequented.
e.

Reasonable Regulations in Streets

Prohibiting players from playing augmented reality games
on streets could also potentially be constitutional, especially in
areas that have excessive motor vehicle traffic. Problems would
arise, however, in areas where there are no sidewalks. If an
ordinance prohibits people from playing augmented reality
games in the streets, then the area of play would be vastly
limited in areas where streets lack sidewalks. It may also be
unreasonable to prohibit someone from playing augmented
reality games on streets that are always closed to motor vehicles
or on occasions where the street is closed for a block party or
festival. If the government’s interest is to prevent players from
causing motor vehicle accidents or from causing traffic, then such
prohibitions during a block party or a festival would seem
overbroad.
Ideally, in areas with sidewalks, legislatures can pass
regulations which limit the playing of augmented reality video
games to sidewalks and to streets which drivers are prohibited
from driving on at that time. Such a regulation would prevent
motor vehicle accidents caused by distracted pedestrian players
while still allowing players to play on streets that lack motor
vehicle traffic either temporarily or constantly. In suburban and
rural areas that lack sidewalks, prohibiting players from playing
in streets may be reasonable on especially busy roads—for
example, roads that have multiple lanes—but are likely
unreasonable in the majority of circumstances.
CONCLUSION
As augmented reality becomes more assimilated into society,
courts will be forced to determine the boundaries of locationbased augmented reality games in relation to their First
Amendment rights in traditional public forums. Likely, permits
are not viable solutions due to the general nature of gameplay,
especially if the permits are aimed at the companies rather than
the players. Time, place, and manner restrictions that regulate
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the players would likely be the most effective way to curb some
problems that result from people playing location-based
augmented reality games, but creating a restriction that is
constitutional is a challenge that legislatures must test.
The most effective way to ease problems caused by individual
players would be to enforce laws already in effect. Such
enforcement would be most consistent with the First Amendment
rights of the players while safeguarding the government’s
legitimate interests. To ease problems caused by assemblies of
players, legislatures will likely have to create new laws. Some
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations may include
small buffer-zones around hospital entrances, prohibiting playing
in streets that have excessive motor vehicle traffic, and allocating
areas for groups of players to freely play.
At times, reasonable time, place, and manner regulations for
groups may be unreasonable for individual players. For example,
prohibiting the playing of augmented reality games during rush
hour on busy sidewalks would better allow for the free flow of
foot traffic, but likely one player could be playing on a busy
sidewalk without causing more pedestrian congestion. Likewise,
an individual playing in a designated quiet section of a park
would likely not disturb the tranquility of the area even if an
assembly of players would. In such situations, it would be unfair
to restrict individual players the same way that one would
restrict assemblies of players. However, individual players could
quickly transform into an assembly of players organically, thus
causing the same problems as if the assembly had been
premeditated. Legislatures and courts may need to choose
between sacrificing some of the protections afforded to individual
players and enabling the government to protect legitimate
government interests that are threatened by assemblies of
players.
Whether the law should favor individual players or
legitimate government interests will depend on the
circumstances. If statistics indicate that a specific area is more
prone to large assemblies of players to the detriment of nonplayers and the purpose of the space, then it may be reasonable
to sacrifice some First Amendment protections of individual
players. Prohibiting the playing of augmented reality games on
excessive foot traffic sidewalks during rush hour would likely be
reasonable if statistics indicated a consistent issue. Prohibiting
players from playing in quiet areas in parks may also be
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reasonable if groups of players are consistent problems, but then
players would need other areas available for them to play. It
would be unreasonable to slowly prohibit players from playing in
every section of a large park because they had been prohibited
from playing in other areas. Designated playing areas may make
prohibiting players from playing in other areas more reasonable.
While regulating the players would likely be the most
effective in protecting legitimate government interests, some
measures regulating designers may be reasonable. For example,
the legislature could require designers to prevent gameplay from
occurring when a person is moving over fifteen miles per hour.198
Ultimately, what will be reasonable regulations for either players
or designers will depend on the circumstances.

198

See supra note 180.

